Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges
We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments. Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed. Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and Interim Individual Rationality are required. We characterize the least upper bound of the central planner's expected revenue. We introduce a stability notion, namely, the marginal core, to the assumption that the central planner's endowment is unprotected. We show that the central planner has a deficit in expectation if and only if the marginal core is non-empty.
Year of publication: |
2011-11
|
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Authors: | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
Institutions: | Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics |
Saved in:
freely available
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