Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is their outcome efficient? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for consumption rights can be designed so as to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive efficient. Moreover, any incentive efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bisin, Alberto ; Gottardi, Piero |
Institutions: | CESifo |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring
Bisin, Alberto, (2004)
-
Optimal Taxation and Constrained Inefficiency in an Infinite-Horizon Economy with Incomplete Markets
Gottardi, Piero, (2011)
-
Risk-Sharing and Contagion in Networks
Cabrales, Antonio, (2014)
- More ...