Efficient Contests
"In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive-based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self-selection constraints and first-best incentives". Copyright (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Riis, Christian |
Published in: |
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 19.2010, 3, p. 643-665
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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