Efficient deterrence does not require that the wealthy should be able to buy justice
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Garoupa, Nuno ; Gravelle, Hugh |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 159.2003, 3, p. 545-552
|
Subject: | Gerichtliche Prozesskosten | Litigation costs | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Theorie | Theory |
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