Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.
Year of publication: |
2013-05-28
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Authors: | Albrecht, James ; Gautier, Pieter ; Vroman, Susan |
Institutions: | Georgetown University, Department of Economics |
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