Efficient Search by Committee

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Furthermore, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.

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Year of publication:	2011-01
Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Search \| Committtees \| Voting \| Mechanism design \| Dynamic pivot mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The price is None Number 1782 10 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800354