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Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.
Year of publication:
1999-10-14
Authors: Maniquet, François ; Sprumont, Yves
Published in:
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1999, 3, p. 583-595
Publisher: Springer
Subject: Strategy-proofness | Efficiency | Linear production set
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application/pdf
Type of publication: Article
Notes:
Received: July 10, 1997 / Revised version: November 24, 1997
Classification: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370920
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