Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons
The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making <italic>intra</italic>personal trade-offs to making <italic>inter</italic>personal trade-offs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that a view which is concerned with both outcome inequality and with the unfairness of inequality in individuals’ expected utilities <italic>can</italic> account for this shift. Finally, we limn an alternative view, on which such inequalities are not intrinsically bad, but nonetheless determine the strength of individuals’ competing claims. We argue that this ‘Competing Claims View’ can also account for the shift.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | VOORHOEVE, ALEX ; FLEURBAEY, MARC |
Published in: |
Utilitas. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 24.2012, 03, p. 381-398
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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