Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Holler, Manfred ; Skott, Peter
Publisher:	Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
Subject:	Election \| campaign platforms \| agenda setting \| cost of ruling \| Condorcet

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2004-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	86680496X [GVK] hdl:10419/105732 [Handle] RePEc:ums:papers:2004-12 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010456985