Elections Can be Manipulated Often
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
Year of publication: |
2008-04
|
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Authors: | Friedgut, Ehud ; Kalai, Gil ; Nisan, Noam |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
Saved in:
freely available
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