Elections with incomplete information
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring the role of incomplete information and learning in elections. The first chapter examines the dynamics of voter learning about candidate ability in repeated elections. The dynamic process of belief revision gives rise to incentives that vary strongly over a politician's career. In particular, candidates become entrenched over time, so, even though they exert little effort, the voter cannot commit to throw incumbents out of office. I embed the basic model in a common agency framework to study seniority norms in legislative organization. The model organizes many of the stylized facts about the U.S. Congress, including the incumbency advantage, the dynamics of effort allocation over a career, the importance of constituency service, and seniority norms in committee assignments. In chapter 2, I study a simple model of campaign finance with possibly asymmetric candidates. Each candidate has the option of promising favors to interest groups in exchange for the funds they need to reveal information to the voters. When the incumbent has a sufficiently large ex-ante advantage, the challenger will be unable to raise funds at all.
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ashworth, Scott |
Other Persons: | James M. Snyder, Jr. (contributor) |
Institutions: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Essays on international finance and economics
Rappoport, Veronica E., (2005)
-
Weinstein, Jonathan, (2005)
-
D'Urso, Victoria Tanusheva, (2002)
- More ...