Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
The non-existence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Bade, Sophie |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 72.2011, 1, p. 12-29
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Uncertainty aversion Multiple priors Median voter Electoral competition over many issues |
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