Electoral design and voter welfare from the US Senate: Evidence from a dynamic selection model
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Gowrisankaran, Gautam ; Mitchell, Matthew F. ; Moro, Andrea |
Published in: |
Review of economic dynamics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1094-2025, ZDB-ID 14061004. - Vol. 11.2008, 1, p. 1-17
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