Emotions Enforce Fairness Norms (a Simple Model of Strong Reciprocity)

In experimental games, many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest and they do that in a reciprocal manner. In addition, many subjects punish those others who behave unkindly, and previous history usually influences subjects’ choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity.

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Year of publication:	2006-11
Authors:	López-Pérez, Raúl
Institutions:	Departamento de Análisis Económico: Teoría Económica e Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	Emotions \| Fairness \| Path-Dependency \| Strong Reciprocity \| Social Norms

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Series:	Working Papers in Economic Theory. - ISSN 1885-6888.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2006/11 40 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D64 - Altruism ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005600514