Employer's information and promotion-seeking activities

This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S.
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Karriereplanung \| Rent Seeking \| Arbeitskräfte \| Zeitverwendung \| Arbeitsproduktivität \| Unternehmer \| Information \| Theorie \| promotion-seeking activities \| contest \| knowledge

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 7023
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	731586034 [GVK] hdl:10419/69418 [Handle]
Classification:	D2 - Production and Organizations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291402