ENABLING TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE COMPLIANCE VIA PRINCIPAL-AGENT INCENTIVE MECHANISMS

A corporation that wants to fully embrace sustainability must address all three pillars of the triple bottom line. Among profit, planet, and people, it is this last category that is hardest to measure directly. When a company has remote locations and cannot directly observe effort, the compliance must be inferred from other metrics. We introduce a game-theoretic model to influence plant compliance to corporate goals.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Manikas, Andrew ; Godfrey, Michael
Published in:	Global Journal of Business Research. - Vol. 5.2011, 2, p. 105-114
Subject:	Sustainability \| Triple-Bottom-Line \| Principal-Agent

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C02 - Mathematical Methods ; C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; M10 - Business Administration. General ; O21 - Planning Models; Planning Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205835