Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d'équilibre bayésien
In this paper, we drop the symmetry assumption in a model of first price procurement auction. We consider the case of two groups of bidders whose costs are drawn from two different uniform distributions. Conditions of existence of a common minimum bid are exhibited and bayesian equilibrium strategies of firms in both groups are computed. We show that these strategies can be written as the symmetric equilibrium strategies more or less a mark-up resulting from the asymmetry.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | BENILAN, Philippe ; MOUGEOT, Michel ; NAEGELEN, Florence |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1997, 46, p. 225-251
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
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