Endogenous and exogenous commitment
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Breig, Zachary |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 183.2019, p. 1-3
|
Subject: | Commitment | Mechanism design | Renegotiation | Repeated games | Spot contracting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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