Endogenous Cartel Formation with Private Information.
This paper considers the effect of private information on the incentive to form a cartel that acts both as a strategy-coordination device and as an information-sharing device. Focusing on involuntary information transmission from the cartel to any outside firms, it is shown that private information can cause a disincentive to the formation of a cartel.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Hviid, Morten |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 25.1992, 4, p. 972-82
|
Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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