Endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly with a welfare-based delegation contract and a sales delegation contract
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
Published in: |
Journal of industry, competition and trade. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1566-1679, ZDB-ID 2067120-9. - Vol. 19.2019, 4, p. 679-737
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Subject: | Cournot competition | Bertrand competition | Endogenous timing of incentive parameters | Mixed duopoly | Welfare-based delegation | Sales delegation | Duopol | Duopoly | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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