Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices

We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Drèze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.''

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Year of publication:	2011-04
Authors:	Valognes, Fabrice ; Ferrer, Hélène ; Owen, Guillermo
Institutions:	Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)
Subject:	Cooperative Game Theory \| Technology Transfers \| Modified Shapley Value

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293463