Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002-11-04
Authors:	Jackson, Matthew O. ; Wilkie, Simon
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	game theory \| mechanism design \| contracts \| side payments \| endogenous games \| public goods

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H41 - Public Goods ; K12 - Contract Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134969