Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fedeli, Silvia ; Santoni, Michele |
Published in: |
Economics of governance. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-6104, ZDB-ID 1491330-6. - Vol. 2.2001, 3, p. 203-229
|
Subject: | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Bürokratietheorie | Theory of bureaucracy | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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