Endogenous Lobbying
In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenouslobbying.We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process. (JEL: D72, D74, D78) Copyright (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Felli, Leonardo ; Merlo, Antonio |
Published in: |
Journal of the European Economic Association. - MIT Press. - Vol. 4.2006, 1, p. 180-215
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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