Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).

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Year of publication:	2005-08
Authors:	Müller, Wieland ; Güth, Werner ; Potters, Jan ; Büchner, Susanne
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Papers on Strategic Interaction.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	9 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765136