Endogenous punishments in agency with verifiable ex post information
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kessler, Anke S. ; Lülfesmann, Christoph ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 46.2005, 4, p. 1207-1231
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Signalling | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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