Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts
Year of publication: |
2010-02
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Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher D. ; Larcker, David F. ; Su, Che-Lin |
Institutions: | Graduate School of Business, Stanford University |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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