Endogenous Timing in Duopoly : Experimental Evidence

In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence.Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Müller, Wieland ; Fonseca, M.A. ; Normann, H.T.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	Commitment \| Endogenous timing \| Experimental economics \| Cournot \| Stackel- berg

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2005-77
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091156