Endogenously Informed Boards and the Optimality of Board Power
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goldman, Eitan |
Publisher: |
[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Vorstand | Executive board | Theorie | Theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Board of Directors | Board of directors |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (32 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 14, 2013 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2022947 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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