Endowment effects in contests
We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Price, Curtis R. ; Sheremeta, Roman M. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 111.2011, 3, p. 217-219
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Rent-seeking Contest Experiments Overbidding Endowment |
Saved in:
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