Enforcement with Costly Group Formation

The joint liability literature claims that positive assortative matching, or risk homogeneity, is always the first best solution. We examine this claim in presence of group formation costs and find that the assertion is not always true

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Chatterjee, Prabirendra
Other Persons:	Sarangi, Sudipta (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kollektives Handeln \| Collective action \| Rechtsdurchsetzung \| Law enforcement \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 9, pp. 1-8, 2005 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 13, 2005 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136892