Enforcing compliance with environmental agreements in the absence of strong institutions : an experimental analysis
Todd L. Cherry; David M. McEvoy
| Year of publication: |
2013
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Cherry, Todd L. ; McEvoy, David M. |
| Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 54.2013, 1, p. 63-77
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| Subject: | Enforcing compliance | Environmental agreements | Experimental economics | Deposit refund | International environmental agreements | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experiment | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Umweltrecht | Environmental law |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009712434