Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel.

This paper considers a model of firms' financing based on the existence of a moral hazard problem in the choice of investment projects by a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. Two alternative ways of funding these projects, called unmonitored (or market) and monitored (or bank) lending, are analyzed.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Repullo, R. ; Suarez, J.
Institutions:	Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
Subject:	MODELS \| MORAL HAZARD \| BANKS \| MONEY \| MONETARY POLICY

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Series:	Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	42 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625747