Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures
"The current study investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an innovator supplying an intellectual asset, a professional assigned to productive tasks, and a consulting firm specializing in matching ideas and professional skills. A rather simple pure tripartite partnership implements the consultant's expected profit maximum and maximizes the project's expected surplus. The liquidity-constrained professional is compensated by receiving a share of one half in the new venture. The consultant's and the innovator's shares reflect the relative value of search. However, the consultant's optimal search effort to find an appropriate production partner is inefficiently low". Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Demougin, Dominique ; Fabel, Oliver |
Published in: |
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 16.2007, 1, p. 111-128
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay
Demougin, Dominique, (2019)
-
Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance
Schoettner, Anja, (2005)
-
Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures
Demougin, Dominique, (2007)
- More ...