Environmental Enforcement Choice : Trading Off Equity for Environmental Benefits

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency policiestoward small and large businesses are explored by reviewing administrative,civil judicial, and criminal enforcement proceedings involving the prosecutionof individual, firm, and government violators. An analysis was done of 325 cases involved with the Clean Air Act, CleanWater Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act during fiscal years1990-1997. Also, the EPA is modeled as an environmental harm minimizer and apolitical support maximizer, and conclusions are drawn regarding whether theEPA's goal is to maximize social welfare and/or minimize violations. Findings indicate that small firms are targeted more frequently than largefirms for criminal prosecution under the air and hazardous waste programsbecause small firm violations were found to be more harmful than thosecommitted by large firms. However, the EPA does more often pursue individualswho work for large firms or government agencies that are involved in criminalbehavior, which is consistent with the idea of social welfare maximinization.This, however, indicates that the EPA may fail to deter adequately thoseindividuals from engaging in further reprehensible violations. (JSD)