Environmental regulation and technology transfers
This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firmfs production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology support the Porter hypothesis, which states that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.
Year of publication: |
2012-12
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asano, Takao ; Matsushima, Noriaki |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Irreversibilities and the Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy under Knightian Uncertainty
Asano, Takao, (2005)
-
Portfolio Inertia and [Epsilon]-Contaminations,
Asano, Takao, (2004)
-
Portfolio Inertia under Ambiguity,
Asano, Takao, (2004)
- More ...