Epsilon-Nash implementation
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Barlo, Mehmet ; Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 102.2009, 1, p. 36-38
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Maskin-monotonicity Implementation Epsilon-Nash equilibrium Limited veto power |
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