Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information : The General Symmetric Case

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Neyman, Abraham ; Sorin, Sylvain
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 27, Iss. 2, August 31, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209435