Equilibrium bids in practical multi-attribute auctions

This article proposes a nonlinear scoring rule which transforms multiple attributes of a bid into comparable dimensionless ones. Practically, the buyer can use it to select the most competitive winner. For risk-neutral bidders, we characterize a symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium and find that as the number of bidders increases the equilibrium quality improves, whereas the equilibrium price decreases.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Wang, Mingxi ; Liu, Shulin
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 3, p. 352-355
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Multi-attribute auctions \| Bidding strategy \| Winner determination

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776635