Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union
We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted average of the countries‘most preferred policy. We then argue that making the bank inflationaverse and/or attentive towards the countries‘ economicdevelopments is undesirable in this context.
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Dixit, Avinash ; Jensen, Henrik |
Institutions: | CESifo |
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