Equilibrium Existence in Incomplete Information Games with Atomic Posteriors
We prove an existence result for games with incomplete information with continuous type spaces under the assumption that players have atomic posteriors. This information structure is an extreme example of the failure of absolute continuity of information, hence our result complements the classical result of Milgrom and Weber (1985).
Year of publication: |
1999-05
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Authors: | Al-Najjar, Nabil ; Solan, Eilon |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Saved in:
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