Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items
We construct an ex post perfect equilibrium in a sequence of second-price auctions with two bidders where each bidder's marginal values for additional units are decreasing. This equilibrium implies an increasing path of transaction prices and is ex post efficient.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Qingmin |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 2, p. 192-194
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Sequential auctions Ex post perfect equilibrium Declining price anomaly |
Saved in:
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