Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
Year of publication: |
2014-03
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Authors: | Eguia, Jon X. ; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Morton, Rebecca ; Nicolò, Antonio |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft |
Subject: | imperfect information | equilibrium selection | passive beliefs | symmetric beliefs | vertical contract- ing | multiple equilibria |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2014_04 |
Classification: | H41 - Public Goods ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
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Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
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Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
- More ...
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Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
-
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
-
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X., (2014)
- More ...