Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information

The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in wellbehaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	de Clippel, Geoffroy
Publisher:	Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Tauschwirtschaft \| Gerechtigkeit \| Allokationseffizienz

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2004-19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	481979158 [GVK] hdl:10419/80083 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318853