Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schlegel, Jan Christoph |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 123.2020, p. 41-53
|
Subject: | College admission | Deferred acceptance | Matching with contracts | Observable substitutes | Strategy-proofness | Substitutes | Matching | Studierende | Students | Hochschule | Higher education institution | Allokation | Allocation | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
-
Decentralized college admissions under single application
Bonkoungou, Somouaoga, (2021)
-
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
Barberà, Salvador, (2022)
-
Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
Martini, Giorgio, (2016)
- More ...
-
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Schlegel, Jan Christoph, (2022)
-
Contracts versus salaries in matching : a general result
Schlegel, Jan Christoph, (2014)
-
Contracts versus salaries in matching : a general result
Schlegel, Jan Christoph, (2015)
- More ...