Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability

Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994), I define a class of abstract games which are proved to be dominance-solvable. I show moreover that, in the leading subclass of co-ordination games, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome.

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Year of publication:	1998-02
Authors:	Mariotti, Marco
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 98/12 11 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005784830