Essays on international trade and institutions

This dissertation consists of three essays in the intersection of International Trade and Institutions. The first essay looks at the effect of trade opening on the efficiency of institutions. I argue that part of the reason why some developing economies have not experienced a boost in economic performance despite increasing trade openness may be related to the interaction between weak institutions and trade. In particular, I construct a model in which trade opening in societies with weak political institutions may lead to worse economic policies. The reason is that general equilibrium price effects of taxation and expropriation in closed economies also hurt the elites, and this puts a natural barrier against inefficient policies. Trade openness removes this barrier and enables groups with political power to exercise this power in more inefficient ways. In the second essay, I analyze how the inefficiency of weak political regimes is shaped by the elites' factor endowments, and how those inefficiencies alter standard predictions about international trade and capital flows. Elites always distort sectors that use intensively factors they own on a larger share less, irrespective of the endowment of the economy.