Estimating matching games with transfers

Jeremy T. Fox

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the valuations from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers

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Year of publication:	March 2018
Authors:	Fox, Jeremy T.
Published in:	Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1759-7331, ZDB-ID 2569569-1. - Vol. 9.2018, 1, p. 1-38
Subject:	Matching \| trading networks \| relationship formation \| semiparametric estimation \| maximum score \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Automobilzulieferindustrie \| Automotive supplier industry \| Lieferantenbewertung \| Supplier evaluation

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/QE823 [DOI] hdl:10419/195562 [Handle]
Classification:	C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; c57 ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; L62 - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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