EU Legitimacy Revisited

EU institutional reforms aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the EU and dealing more effectively with the complex challenges of globalisation and the risk society, haven't been adequately explained and understood. For large segments of public opinion, technocratic governance by ‘unelected officials', rather than national governments, are to blame for their economic hardship. For the first time in EU history, there is strong pressure for a roll-back involving repatriation of competences - and more intergovernmentalism for the exercise of the remaining ones.The central issue in the academic debate following the massive transfers of powers to the EU is whether there are alternatives to the indirect and substitute forms of legitimacy experimented in the EU. In actual fact, the successive re-weightings of the vectors of legitimacy have made the EU more democratic. The legislative and judicial functions are now organised in accordance with federal principles. The way forward consists in an overhaul of the executive. The most far-reaching suggestion is related to the fusion of the Commission with the Council, leading to the creation of a European government. Such an option is unrealistic in the current context. Two other options, capable of enhancing EU legitimacy, are on the table and merit further consideration. The first option consists of enhancing the legitimacy of the Commission by having its president directly elected by the citizens. The main difficulty with any reform entailing the politicisation of the Commission, is how to deal with the performance of its tasks as ‘guardian of the treaties', as well as its role in the enforcement of competition law. These tasks would have to be entrusted to independent agencies.The second option would be limited to changes in the governance of the Eurozone. The process of its transformation into a fiscal union has already started and it might in time lead to political union. While some reforms could be introduced by amending the EU treaties, others would require a new institutional design. Progress within the Eurozone would thus correspond to the functional logic in terms of the scope of integration and to the federal logic in terms of institutional design