Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons
Year of publication: |
2007-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fong, Kyna |
Institutions: | Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University |
Subject: | Moral Hazard | surgical contracts | adverse selection | evaluation methology |
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